Oslander, 1835-1836) 2.732-38, from §147, "Letztes Dilemma." The previous section ( §146: "Die speculative Christologie") cites Hegel, Marheineke, and Rosenkranz for its very orthodox Christology. In §147 however Strauss claims that Christology finds its real meaning in the whole human species of world history rather than in a single individual. He mentions Hegel only once (737) in §147; the section seems to be a development of Hegel's thought rather than a strict explication of it. Peter C. Hodgson provides was controversial in its time 12 and even today scholars are divided about its merits. 13 Current disagreement over Hegel's meaning indi cates that the old controversies remain unresolved, because Hegel's own position still needs explication.
By attempting such an explication, the following pages will show that Strauss's interpretation has good grounds-that in fact it makes better sense of Hegel's texts than the Christian interpretation which finds Hegel in agreement with traditional church doctrine. By defend ing Strauss's interpretation of Hegel I do not of course mean to defend it as a valid interpretation of Christianity. My goal is rather to show how sharply Hegel's thought diverges from traditional Christology. Strauss only serves my purpose to the extent that he emphasizes the universalist direction of Hegel's theory.
Strauss in fact may not have interpreted Hegel accurately enough. His interpretation often appeals to the universality of God as an eternal idea; and this theme certainly is fundamental to Hegel's thought. Strauss however is not very precise about the meaning of divine universality as it expresses itself in human being. He seems to prefer a collective interpretation of universal humanity, according to which all human beings taken together correspond to God's universality. But this is not Hegel's own meaning. In his description of spirit in the Christian Church, Hegel distinguishes two stages of universal thinking: the preliminary one of imagination, and the final one of true conceptual thought. The Christian view of spirit uses imagination, and so it is "not yet the form of thinking itself, of the concept as concept, but [is only] the universality of actuality, the allness of selves, and the lifting of existence (Erhebung des Daseins) into imagination (Vorstellung).
9 ' 14 This "allness of selves" corresponds to the collective universality found in Strauss; but for Hegel it is an image abstracted from actual existence rather than a concept which comprehends it. 15 The Hegelian concept must then be different: namely, a definition which applies universally to each single instance illustrating it. The universal meaning of the incarnation would then refer to every instance of rational human being. This meaning is a much better interpretation of Hegel than the one offered by Strauss. It gives "universality" an individual rather than a collective meaning. And this meaning (of a repeatedly individual incarnation) also appears in other parts of the Phenomenology.
THE INCARNATION IN HEGEL'S PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT
How does the Phenomenology support the interpretation of a universal divine incarnation? Five topics will be investigated: "the appearing God" of conscience, the meaning of spirit, revelation or manifestation, the Christian Church, and the relation of religion to philosophy. Because Hegel is especially obscure in the Phenomenology, none of these topics is easy to describe.
Conscience
In the Phenomenology divine incarnation develops out of conscience, the moral thinking of German idealism.
16 Hegel refers to "the appearing God" at the very end of his analysis of conscience, when "evil" 14 Phänomenologie 407.27-30. 16 Hegel's contrast of image and concept also explains why Strauss emphasizes universal humanity's progress more than its logical foundation in Hegel's concept of God: for Strauss images of actuality are more important than their conceptual basis. 16 Cf. Daniel P. Jamros, "The Appearing God in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit," CLIO 19 (1990) 353-65. individual thinking is pardoned; pardon occurs because this evil consciousness knows its resemblance to another consciousness, and so proves itself to be a universal thinking which grasps the essence common to different individuals; it is a "pure knowing"* 7 of essence, and is therefore universal or "good." This is the reason for its pardon. And because it is at the same time both universal and individual thinking, human subjectivity is acknowledged as the individual appearance of universal (divine) essence, and so is called "the appearing God."
18 This principle then serves as the basis for Chapter 7, entitled "Religion," which studies the development of divine appearance in various world religions. Christianity concludes this development by recognizing Jesus as the real incarnation of God.
But if the universal God appears as human subjectivity (which thinks universally), why limit God's incarnation to the single figure of Jesus? Since every human being thinks the universal, and is thereby an instance of universal thinking, every human being contains the appearance of universal essence, at least in principle. Or so it would seem from the movement of consciousness up to this point in the Phenomenology. As explained by Hegel, the incarnational principle seems to apply to anyone who thinks and acts universally.
One could of course object that Hegel develops the principle in such a way that only Jesus becomes the fall incarnation of God. We could then ignore the argument from conscience, which deals only with the basis for incarnational religion but not with its actual realization. But the remaining four topics from the Phenomenology indicate the contrary. They all come from Hegel's treatment of divine incarnation in Christ, and they show that he does in fact describe such a universally "appearing God." Spirit In Phenomenology 7, "spirit" has an incarnational meaning that indicates God's human appearance. Although it is convenient for us to refer to "the incarnation," Hegel himself uses the term sparingly in the Phenomenology. He makes only two references to the "incarnation"
19
of God in Jesus, and two more to Jesus as a "divine human"; 20 one such reference calls him "the individual divine human" 21 in contrast to the Christian Church as "the universal divine human."
22 But this dearth of explicit terminology causes no problems, because Phenomenology 7 essentially deals with divine-human unity as its main theme. In that chapter "spirit" has an incarnational meaning: "spirit . 26 Terms like "spirit" and its two components of "universal essence" and "individual existence" have in view the same conjunction of divine and human that we find in a traditional term like "incarnation."
Given this incarnational meaning, does the term "spirit" have a unique or a universal application? Understanding it as unique brings an immediate difficulty. If "spirit" refers here to Jesus alone as the unique incarnation of God, then the term has acquired a more limited application than it has hitherto had. In Chapter 6 (entitled "Spirit," "Der Geisf), it refers to human subjectivity in general. If however in Chapter 7 "spirit" refers only to the single incarnation of God in Jesus, it restricts the meaning hitherto developed and thus disrupts the book's continuity. But if incarnational spirit refers potentially to any human being, the book's coherence is preserved. Of course the particular case in view in "The Manifest Religion" (the concluding section of Chapter 7) is the incarnation of God in Jesus, but we obtain a more coherent sense of spirit if Jesus illustrates the general phenomenology of spirit, whose developing meaning applies to all human beings in principle.
Against this position is the possibility that Hegel means to distinguish between spirit in general and the "absolute spirit" 27 whose presence in Jesus makes him different from other humans. But since Hegel also used the phrase "absolute spirit" 28 for "the appearing God" in his analysis of conscience (which referred to German idealism), the possibility of its referring to Jesus alone in "Manifest Religion" is very questionable. In his text the phrase "absolute spirit" must refer to universal human being, as the example of conscience indicates. Furthermore, "the appearing God" of conscience emerges "among those who know themselves as pure [universal] knowing* rather than as unique individuals; "absolute spirit" therefore pertains to more than one person. It can include any self which attains the universal capability of rational thinking.
Hegel's further description of the incarnation of God in Jesus confirms this conclusion. He emphasizes that this incarnation is truly grounded in God (here identified with universal being or substance), inasmuch as "being in general or [ But what exactly does it imply? The phrase "world-spirit" may suggest the collective universal associated with Strauss's interpretation. But a collective consciousness does not exist; what does exist is a number of individual subjectivities which think universally. Such universal thinking always occurs as individual subjectivity or personality. Thus the "world-spirit" knows itself in God incarnate when thoughtful individuals recognize themselves in the individual person of Jesus: because he resembles every universal-minded thinker, the "worldspirit" is able to know itself in him. Hegel's use of "world-spirit" 39 refers not to a vague type of collective consciousness but to "the faith of the world," 40 which is the faith of many individuals. And since the world-spirit knows itself (in Christian faith) as divine, the incarnation will soon expand from the single person of Jesus to a "universal divine human."
4 But before we turn to that "universal divine human," we can gain more insight into Hegel's position by exploring the way spirit reveals itself 42 through the single incarnation in Jesus. This revelation implies a universal incarnation rather than a unique one. 
Revelation or Manifestation

Since for Hegel spirit is "[divine] essence that essentially is [human]
self-consciousness" 43 or essence "that essentially assumes human shape," 44 one must speak of it as both divine and human; Hegel's God is the world-essence that eventually becomes human being. Through human thinking this essence comes to know itself. 45 Thus one could speak of deity revealing itself to itself. The revelation to humans is the same occurrence from the human point of view: God is known to humans as human, as "one like us." Since essence's development terminates in human thinking, essence is knowable as human being. Whereas Christianity believes in an infinite mystery that remains mysterious despite its revelation, Hegel's God is the world-essence revealing itself as human thinking. True religion must therefore reveal God as human.
Christianity is "the manifest religion" (Phenomenology 7, C) for that very reason. Hegel writes:
Consequently in this religion divine essence has been manifested ¡geoffenbart].
Its being manifest [Offenbarseyn] manifestly consists in this, that what it is is known. It is however known just insofar as it is known as spirit, as essence that essentially is [human] self-consciousness.
46
God is knowable because the self is knowable, and God has been revealed as a human self. 47 For traditional Christology God is revealed in a human being but the two natures remain different, so that God remains a mystery; belief that God was in Christ yields little knowledge of God's essence. For Hegel however the difference between the two natures has been surmounted: 40 God's essence is essentially human. Therefore the humanity of Jesus adequately reveals divine essence-not because God is uniquely present in Jesus but because God appears in all human being. This interpretation becomes even more plausible by a further description of divine essence revealing itself: "this pure universal So far my argument has appealed to Hegel's explanatory language. The argument may appear slender because it presses the universal meaning of terms and disregards the meaning they possess in Christian faith. One can always suppose that Hegel wanted to be loyal to Christianity and simply failed to use language precise enough to preserve an orthodox Christian meaning. Such a supposition however has no textual basis. On the contrary, the language of his text supports the principle of a more universal divine incarnation.
Moreover, his argument requires this type of interpretation. If the basis for Hegel's understanding of incarnation lies in the appearance of universal divine essence as the universal thinking of human subjectivity, then incarnation is necessarily connected to universality. This universal God appears as universal thinking, which by definition cannot be restricted to a single person but must be common to all. Consequently the very principle of incarnation calls for its universal extension to all who know themselves as universal thinking. For universality marks not simply the universal object of thought, but also the subjective thinking of it. Such thinking is universal not only within a given individual subject but also in multiple human subjects who equal one another in their universal thinking. Thus the one divine essence must appear in all of them. The incarnation of God in Jesus thereby extends itself to the universal Church.
The Christian Church
Hegel appeals to this universal appearance of God when he explains the transition from the earthly Jesus to the Christian Church. Only a 50 But insofar as God and human being are distinct moments of one concept, they are also "different* of Jesus. In all these cases divine presence appears through the uni versal knowing of human subjectivity. What makes God present in the Church is "this depth of the pure self' 77 in its universal thinking. For Hegel divine presence occurs in the Church through human knowing and not through the hidden power of the glorified Christ. Therefore when Hegel calls the Church "the universal divine human," 78 he must mean that the Church is as divine as "the individual divine human."
79
They differ (as we said before) not in divinity but only by their differ ent extensiveness.
In fact one could argue that for Hegel the Church is even more divine than Jesus, since its universality conforms better to the universal do minion of divine essence. In contrast to this Church, the individual appearance of God in Jesus was not fully equal to the universality of essence; it was in fact "an [existence] alien or external to it," 80 and so it needs to be completed by the Church. Such language clearly indi cates that the universal Church gives a better appearance of deity than did the individual Jesus. The "universal divine human, the commu nity" 81 provides a better revelation for universal divine essence than does "the individual divine human."
82 And so once again we have to understand Hegel as maintaining something like a universal incarna tion of God, contrary to the common teaching of the Church.
This conclusion holds true even though Hegel never uses the phrase "universal incarnation." Since he describes the unity of God and Jesus in more or less the same way as the unity of God and other people, Hegel must not find any substantial difference between Jesus and other humans. Therefore it seems reasonable to speak of a universal incarnation (for Hegel's philosophy) comparable in quality to the unique incarnation maintained by Christianity.
Of course Hegel recognizes that Christian eschatological hope op poses his own conclusion by imagining its full unity with God as "a distant 
Yet how would Hegel's concept differ from the Church's eschatological imagining?
To say that the concept shows only the necessity of this eschatological future does not do justice to Hegel's text, which here criticizes imagination for viewing a different future. Since Christian imagination places unity with God in the future, the concept must place it in the present. But according to Hegel the Church already thinks of God as present in the community. Therefore the concept must go further, by thinking of God as fully present in the communityimplying once again a universal incarnation. Despite its thinking of God as present in all selves of the community, the Christian Church lacks a universal concept that would comprehend all human being as the real existence of divine essence. This deficiency opens the way to philosophy-the "absolute knowing" which surpasses religion.
Philosophy
Hegel's "absolute knowing" is a "speculative knowing" which resembles Christianity. His description of their congruence is difficult; I try to explain the meaning through notes and bracketed additions to Hegel's own text: 87 In other words, Christianity-despite its use of imagining-remains true because it coincides with Hegel's philosophy. Two more particular points in this text call for special comment. First, there is Hegel's claim in the first sentence that speculative knowing not only knows God but is God. Since God is universal divine essence appearing as universal thinking in human subjectivity, different kinds of universal thinking may qualify as divine appearance; but the best kind is philosophy, the pure thinking of universal metaphysics and logic. It follows however that God appears in the philosopher even 87 Ibid. 407.1-7. 88 Here "thinking" refers not to a conscious mind but to logic or thought, as indicated by its equivalence to "pure essence." Thinking in the active sense appears later in the quotation, as the "self of human being. 89 In Hegelian thought, a determinate state usually implies an opposite or contrary, which leads to a higher integration. Thus nature implies thinking, which synthesizes it. more profoundly than in Jesus. 90 Divine incarnation therefore cannot be restricted to Jesus alone in the system of Hegel, because universal divine essence is accessible to many types of universal thinking and most of all to pure philosophy. Second, there is the description of God in the second sentence as the three parts of the Hegelian system: logic, natural being, and self or spirit. In the system spirit can be considered both as u this [individual self, namely subjectivity as individual] and [also as each instance of human subjectivity, namely as] universal self' 91 because what applies to one self must apply to all. Given the generality of logic, this conclusion is reasonable; speculative thinking envisages the self in general, or every self. An individual self can be recognized as divine because every self has an intellect which manifests divine essence. Hegel's description of his philosophy thus provides us with a good clue to his own thinking on the incarnation. Through speculative thinking he applies to Christianity the incarnational principle that emerged in his analysis of conscience, namely divine essence appearing as universal thinking in human subjectivity. He then draws the conclusion implied by Christian ecclesiology, namely that the incarnation must be universal in principle.
God is attainable only in pure speculative knowing, and is only in it and is only it itself, for He is spirit; and this speculative knowing is [also] the knowing of the manifest [or
The extent to which this happens also measures the extent of Hegel's unorthodox interpretation; for by understanding divine incarnation as the appearance of universal essence in human intelligence, Hegel supplies no reason to limit this incarnation to the single person of Jesus. He does of course recognize that Christians honor Jesus as the unique incarnation of God. But his own explanation of the basis for their belief makes the belief seem incomplete. Hegel indeed supports Christian faith in God incarnate, because it anticipates his own position that divine substance expresses itself through human subjectivity. But whereas Christian faith or imagining exalts the uniqueness of Christ, Hegel develops concepts that apply to all human beings. Consequently 90 But here the following distinction should apply: though God appears in a superior way through philosophical thinking, a nonphilosopher (like Jesus) can surpass the philosopher in moral behavior. Such behavior applies universal thinking to empirical reality, and so manifests universal divine essence in real existence.
91 Phänomenologie 407.6. 92 Ibid. 407.4, 6. 93 The Church's knowing does of course restrict the full incarnation of God to Jesus alone-a restriction that does not appear in speculative knowledge, because philosophy (unlike religion) has "the form of thinking itself, of the concept as concept' (ibid. 407.28) or of pure universal essence which develops itself into the universal thinking of every rational human being. his philosophical exposition of the incarnation contains a criticism of Christian imagination, which recognizes only Jesus as God incarnate.
THE INCARNATION IN HEGEL'S LECTURES ON RELIGION
Between his Phenomenology (1807) and his Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion (from 1821 to 1831), 94 Hegel wrote no separate treatise on religious topics. The lectures on religion develop the religious themes treated earlier by the Phenomenology, and it is natural to wonder whether any significant changes in his thinking have occurred.
Conflicting Evidence
If we pursue Hegel's treatment of the incarnation in his Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, we discover some new emphases, along with some expressions already familiar to readers of the Phenomenology. But his interpretation of the incarnation has not changed at all, as the following paragraphs will argue.
In that. But the concept of divine-human unity itself implies its universalidea." 108 As the universal essence for all of reality, the one eternal idea realizes itself in every rational human being. The one Son of the idea thus multiplies into many real sons and daughters. In contrast to this, the unique incarnation seems to limit God's universal truth.
On the other hand, Hegel seems to agree with Christian belief when he claims that the Son "is this unique [individual] , not several. ... In several, divinity becomes an abstraction." 109 A unique incarnation avoids abstraction and so emphasizes the reality of God's presence in Jesus. But the reality does not seem to end with Jesus, for "in one-[are] all." 110 The very argument for a single incarnation has universal implications, because a single clear case illustrates the universal far more decisively than would a number of cases that still did not include all. A plurality of incarnations would not refer to all human beings universally, because many others would still not be included in the group. In emphasizing the single incarnation of God in Jesus, Hegel argues not against a universal one but only against a selectively universal one that would refer to "some but not all." A single incarnation is preferable just because it better illustrates the universal concept of God's presence in every individual human subjectivity.
In 1827 Hegel again suggests a universal meaning while emphasizing the unique incarnation. Since "the unity of divine and human nature ... is the [objective essence] in itself of humans," 111 a universal incarnation seems implied. On the other hand, this "unity of divine and human nature must appear in a [single] human," 112 for two distinct reasons. First, "'because it is not a question of the thought of humanity but of sensory certainty" 113 which knows only individual empirical beings. 114 God's unique appearance corresponds to human consciousness, which begins with individual beings and recognizes only them as really existing; thus only a single incarnation is appropriate for immediate sensory experience. Second, a unique incarnation separates divine appearance from the rest of experience, and thereby shows divine-human unity as an idea '"beyond immediate consciousness, [beyond] normal consciousness and knowing." 115 According to this reason God (as essence) lies beyond empirical knowledge and so is different from empirical beings. This difference appears in a single incarnation which makes the Son different from other humans.
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In the lectures of 1831 we find an additional reason for a unique incarnation: "As spirit... God contains the moment of subjectivity and individuality in himself; his appearance, therefore, can only be a single one, it can take place only once." 117 Spirit is the appearance of divine essence as individual self-consciousness, which requires a single separate personality.
Hegel's reasoning in both 1827 and 1831 does provide some attractive arguments. But still one wonders whether they explain the single incarnation as a phenomenon of Christian belief or whether they offer the final position of speculative philosophy as well. Perhaps Hegel is merely attempting to explain why God appeared to Christians through a single incarnation. Such an explanation would not necessarily correspond to the ultimate truth as philosophy understands it. We have already seen the universal implications of texts from the 1821 manuscript. The ones from 1827 and 1831 do not point in the same direction-at least not on the surface. The surface meaning however causes problems, as the following considerations will show.
The Evidence Analyzed
Taken together, the lectures from 1827 and 1831 provide three arguments for an individual incarnation: (1) sensory certainty knows things as individual, (2) God is different and therefore individual, and (3) subjectivity is always individual. Now the first argument can be easily interpreted as a pedagogical accommodation. God must appear as individual because only individuals have empirical reality, and therefore only individuals can be known with sensory certainty; if God appeared as many individuals, the reality of divine-human unity would not be so clearly and decisively impressed upon humans. Likewise for the second argument: God must appear as individual in order to show the distinctive reality of deity, which would be obscured if God appeared in more than one human. Again the argument seems directed toward making a forceful impression upon human knowing. The third argument links individuality to spirit. But individual subjectivity can hardly be limited to a single person, since "F applies to everyone. Divine spirit does contain subjectivity, but as the universal essence it should contain every subjectivity rather than just a single one. This last point leads to a deeper (and more systematic) problem in the interpretation of Hegel. If God can appear only as one human person because divine spirit "contains the moment of subjectivity and individuality," 118 divine essence is imagined as a separate subject resembling the discrete subjects of empirical being. The other two arguments carry the same implication. God is imagined as a separate subject if it befits the distinctiveness of God as an idea "beyond immediate consciousness" 119 to appear as a distinctive human being, separate from other humans; and again if "sensory certainty" 120 needs an individual incarnation in order to be convinced of the truth of divinehuman unity. The three reasons from 1827 and 1831 converge in their common understanding of a separate subjectivity for God incarnate. The position they represent corresponds well to traditional Christianity and its belief in God as a distinct and transcendent person (or persons).
But this position leads to difficulties within a Hegelian outlook. If divine subjectivity appears only in the humanity of Jesus, it remains a subject separate from other human beings. The distinct personality of the incarnate Son reflects the separateness of God as a transcendent being. In the Phenomenology however such a separation was unsatisfactory, and so it led to the further developments of the Christian Church and absolute knowing. The separate subjectivity of an individual incarnation was necessary to bring home to human consciousness the truth of divine-human unity, for only a unique incarnation, or the incarnation in a unique individual, could reveal the unity of deity with individual human subjectivity. But once this truth was manifest in an individual incarnation, spirit had to show its universal extent, which led to the Christian Church as the more universal expression of absolute spirit. The Church however fails to grasp its full unity with God in the present, since it continues to imagine God as transcendent. Its eschatological hope indicates that its unity with God is not yet realized. And since Hegel criticizes Christianity for such a view, then his absolute knowing has to be interpreted as correcting the defect by a concept of universal divine-human unity in the present. Now if we fit the Lectures into the scheme of the Phenomenology we can easily understand that the unique incarnation (as portrayed in the lectures) was necessary, for the reasons Hegel has given. But spirit cannot remain there, because "in itself divine and human nature is not different"; 121 and so deity must include all of humanity. For Hegel the doctrine of reconciliation (of God with sinful humans) universalizes the divine-human unity found in the incarnation. If we abstract from the traditional Christian understanding of incarnation and reconciliation, we see that for Hegel they both express the same type of unity; they differ only by their different extensiveness.
A unique incarnation conceals the universality of the idea, which properly pertains to all individual subjects. Its conceptual universality is not revealed to religion, for then religion would become philosophy. Grasping the idea through an individual incarnation is proper to religion and serves to distinguish it from philosophy. All of Hegel's reasons for the individual incarnation serve to justify the Christian faith, for they explain why an individual incarnation is "necessary." It seems necessary however only for preconceptual thinking, which discovers divine-human unity through an individual case. In fact an individual case best illustrates the concept of spirit as God's appearance in indi vidual subjectivity. But philosophy (as in Hegel's Phenomenology) moves beyond individual cases to universal principles. And then the unity of divine and human nature appears to refer to a universal kind of incarnation rather than to a single one. Hegel's reasons for a unique incarnation explain Christian belief in the singular empirical exis tence of God incarnate, but they do not do justice to the universal side of divine essence.
This latter aspect hovers in the background in the Lectures without ever taking center stage. From time to time it steps forth, however, to remind us of its existence. Thus a passage from the 1824 lectures clearly expresses the universality of divine essence, which includes everything empirical. The passage reads: the truth could appear ... in manifold sensory ways, for the idea is one in all, universal necessity; actuality can only be a mirror (Spiegel) of the idea. Con sequently the idea can emerge for consciousness from everything, for it is always the idea [that is] in these infinitely many drops which mirror back (widerspiegeln) the idea.
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As the context makes clear, the sensory content "elevated to the uni versal" 123 idea is the humanity of Jesus; the universal idea appears in him when the community believes in his divinity. tion is clearly implied; an individual appearance would only be the accidental occasion for the universal truth of divine-human unity to first appear. If every part of sensory actuality reflects the idea, it is hard to avoid concluding that divine-human unity could be expressed by any human being. As "one in all" 127 the divine essence must imply the "universal necessity" 128 of divine-human unity. It remains true however that this "universal necessity" is less clear in the Lectures than in the Phenomenology, even though several pas sages in the Lectures do hint at it. A good explanation for this differ ence in the two works may be found in the scope Hegel gave to each of them. In the Phenomenology Hegel integrates religion into other types of knowing, and indeed derives its peculiar themes (like the incarna tion) from the common resources of human knowing. And since reli gion in that earlier work leads to Hegel's own system, he has to explain religion as preparing for the conceptual knowing of his own philoso phy. In particular, the individual incarnation of God in Jesus and the incomplete presence of God in the church belong to the inferior know ing of imagination, which the pure universal knowing of the Hegelian concept should surpass. Consequently religion in the Phenomenology is always described with a view to the system to which the whole Phe nomenology serves as an introduction.
129 When Hegel explains reli gious themes like the incarnation in this early work, the explanations indicate a radical rethinking of religion, because he interprets religion as a lesser form of his own philosophy.
In the Lectures this pressure has relaxed. Religious imagination does not constantly stand in the shadow of the philosophical concept, and so it often seems to enjoy a strength of its own, which Hegel describes with much admiration. Without ever letting religion stand entirely on its own-for the very title of the lectures makes religion into a field of study for philosophy-Hegel does accept it as a distinct branch of knowledge and seems more willing to explain it on its own terms. Since the Lectures (unlike the Phenomenology) do not follow the progress of knowledge to conceptual knowing, there is no need for Hegel to explicitate the universal unity of God and human being, which contains the principle of universal incarnation. In the Lectures for the most part he dwells on the individual appearance of God in Jesus, and therefore seems to remain more faithful to Christian belief. As a result his Christianity resembles church doctrine more in the Lectures than in the Phenomenology. But this more conventional appearance does not mean that Hegel abandoned the views of his earlier Phenomenology. On the contrary, that earlier book provides the philosophical context for correctly interpreting his later lectures on religion. The 1831 lectures 130 repeat the Phenomenology^ claim that religion remains imagination and thus lacks the true form of thinking. 131 When it does acquire the true form of thinking, its doctrine of incarnation has to become universal, as the Phenomenology had suggested a quarter of a century earlier.
CONCLUSION
From the foregoing exposition we can better appreciate Hegel's interpretation of Christianity, especially its doctrine of the incarnation.
According to Hegel Christian faith in the unique incarnation of God in Jesus not only expresses the fundamental truth of divine-human unity, but also emphasizes the appearance ofthat unity in individual subjectivity. When Hegel gives that unity a universal extension, he still preserves the individual meaning of human personality: the incarnation extends to all rational human beings not collectively but individually, as personal subjects. Multiple incarnations follow from Hegel's view of God as an underlying essence individualizing itself in human subjectivity. God is then present in every rational human being.
Philosophy universalizes this incarnation simply through the universality of its concepts. Christianity anticipates this conclusion by its recognition of Spirit in the Church, which universalizes divine presence from the single person of Jesus to the whole body of Christ. However, the Church fails to grasp the full implication of Spirit's universal presence by continuing to think of God as transcendent and separate. For the Church a unique incarnation of God preserves divine transcendence; but for Hegel the universal incarnation eliminates transcendence.
Strauss correctly grasped Hegel's meaning of the divinity of the whole Church. However, Strauss's tendency to view the universal incarnation as a collective one supposes a nonconceptual image of collective humanity. For Hegel himself collective actuality is only an image of the concept, whereas universal essence (properly conceived) becomes individual existence in every instance of its realization. Thus the incarnation of God occurs in human individuals, rather than in a collective humanity.
There are then two levels of image that precede that concept of divine-human unity: the image of an individual incarnation as found tive philosophy, one must conclude that such philosophy has no place for the "image" of Christ as the unique incarnation of God.
Nevertheless Yerkes 136 argues that Jesus retains an epistemic importance within the ontological universality of divine-human unity. In other words, all humans incarnate God but Jesus is unique as the first revealer of divine-human unity. Thus he will always remain the revealer of this truth to the human race. This appears to be a good way for a Hegelian to safeguard the Christian primacy of Jesus. Since religion precedes philosophy, the unique image of Christ precedes the concept and in fact reveals it.
One wonders however whether Hegel himself would agree with such a claim. Without doubt the Christian religion does reveal to philosophy the concept of divine-human unity. But this is before philosophy begins its own work. When thinking for itself, speculative philosophy has to ground its own content in a priori reason rather than in revelation or history. As a self-grounding thought the concept cannot appeal to history for its truth, except as illustration or confirmation. What reveals the universal truth of the incarnation for philosophy is not the historical figure of Jesus but thinking itself.
1
Consequently Jesus must have only an external relation to such philosophy, and is not part of its content. His epistemic importance is thus another "image" that has no place in speculative thinking.
Such an image will of course remain an object for religion. But when philosophy develops the universal truth of divine-human unity from its own thinking, it replaces the historical revealer of religion by reason itself. Jesus then disappears into the universal essence of thought, present in every rational human thinking that reflects the presence of God.
